![]() ![]() 213–28), in which he (rightly) argues against the (Bradleian) view that Hegel reduces nature to our experience of it. He first presented such an interpretation of Hegel in print in “The Philosophy of Nature in Hegel’s System” (Review of Metaphysics 3 No. Harris remarked that he has maintained for 60 years that Hegel is a realist. At the 13h Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America (“Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature,” Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., Sept. Jahrhunderts/Science and Subjectivity: The Vienna Circle and 201h Century Philosophy, pp. Vossenkuhl, eds., Wissenschaft and Subjektivität: Der Wiener Kreis and die Philosophie 20. Michael Rosen notes in passing, as if it were obvious, that Hegel was “one of the most epistemologically realistic philosophers who ever drew breath” (“Modernism and the Two Traditions in Philosophy,” in: D. 19, titled “Hegelian Realism,” Turner points out that the question about evidence of Hegel’s realism isn’t whether there is any, but rather where to stop cataloging its bounty (ibid., pp. Turner, A Theory of Direct Realism (New York: Macmillan, 1925). Recently I found another predecessor who recognized Hegel’s realism: J.E. Pippin’s responses are published with our comments. 18–27) I presented mine in “Hegel, Idealism, and Robert Pippin” (International Philosophical Quarterly 33 No. Harris presented his disagreements in “The Problem of Kant” (Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 19, pp. Harris and I thus disagree with Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). I have argued independently for these views in Hegel’s Epistemological Realism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 hereafter “HER”).
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